were promoted at higher rates than managers and administrators were but had similar quitting rates. These combined findings do not lend direct support for a moderating role of occupational group affiliation. However, they suggest that by differentially affecting promotion opportunities, occupational group affiliation does affect the promotion-quit relationship.
policy variable, succeed in retaining good employees, and the first step in seeking the answer is to evaluate whether and how these rewards affect employees' behavior.
The centrality of promotion and turnover to individuals and organizations has made their study of interest to a variety of disciplines such as microeconomics (e.g., Mclaughlin, 1991) , organizational behavior (e.g., Carson, Carson, Griffeth, & Steel, 1994; Griffeth, Hom, & Gaertner, 2000; Mobley, 1977 Mobley, , 1982 Staw, 1984; Trevor, 2001; Trevor, Gerhart, & Boudreau, 1997) , and sociology (e.g., Elvira, 2001; Kalleberg & Mastekaasa, 2001; Rosenbaum, 1984) . It brings together such diverse issues as careers, organizational structure and strategy, reward allocation and equity, human resource policies, and employees' motivation and behavior. Despite much interest, research on the relationship between promotion and turnover has produced inconclusive and conflicting findings (Johnston, Griffeth, Burton, & Carson, 1993) . Petersen, Spilerman, and Dahl (1989) found a negative relationship between promotion and what they called "departure" rates-particularly, departures for career reasons. A meta-analysis by Carson et al. (1994) showed no significant relationships between satisfaction from promotion and turnover or between perceived promotional opportunities and turnover. However, based on three samples drawn from two studies (Dreher, 1982; Stumpf & Dawley, 1981) , Carson et al. (1994) did find a significant negative relationship between actual promotion and turnover. Trevor et al. (1997) was the first study to focus on the net effect of promotions (controlling for pay). These researchers reasoned that the reported negative associations between promotion and turnover might in fact have been driven by the relationship of salary growth with both variables. Indeed, Trevor et al. (1997) found that once salary growth was controlled, actual promotions positively predicted turnover, with poor performer turnover most strongly affected. These researchers explained their exceptional findings by arguing that even though promotions may diminish the desirability of movement because of salary growth and other intrinsic benefits, the signal they provide to the external job market on the employee's ability (e.g., Mclaughlin, 1991) outweighs other inversely related effects that contribute to diminishing the desirability of movement.
These and other studies show that, rather than being clear-cut, the predicted promotion-turnover relationship is influenced by countervailing forces and that their ultimate direction may be contingent on (a) the way promotion and turnover are defined and measured and (b) the inclusion of other variables that might influence the relationship. Therefore, a more fruitful way to extend our understanding of the promotion-turnover relationship is to further explore its contingent nature and the mechanisms governing it.
One way in which we follow this intuition is to look at actual promotion, as opposed to perceptions of or attitudes toward promotion. Although conceptually related, different operationalizations of promotion may operate through distinct causal routes: Promotion satisfaction measures affective responses, perceptions of promotion opportunities measure cognitive responses, and actual promotion is an objective measure of behavior (Carson et al., 1994) . Although theories of turnover (Mobley, 1982; Mobley, Griffeth, Hand, & Mezilno, 1979) generally highlight the role of promotion in the decision processes of employees, research that relates actual quit behavior to actual promotions is relatively scarce. Only a few empirical studies have investigated the nature and magnitude of the relationship between promotion and turnover directly and in detail (Halaby, 1986; Konda & Stewman, 1980; Petersen et al., 1989; Trevor et al., 1997) . More specifically, this article investigates the argument that actual promotions will reduce an employee's rate of turnover. This relationship is likely to be more pronounced in large organizations in which wages and benefits are determined by one's position in the organizational hierarchy.
A second way in which we seek to extend pertinent knowledge on promotion and turnover is to highlight its multilevel nature. The essence of promotion and turnover processes is that they involve both the individual and the organization and have different implications for each. Practically, there is a certain asymmetry in the reward arrangement in that although the individual gets the promotion, the promotion is awarded by the organization. Furthermore, at least in the short run, individuals are less capable of changing the organizational reward system and can therefore either accept it or quit. By contrast, although voluntary turnover affects organization level outcomes, the individual employees are the locus of interest because it is they who decide to stay or leave the organization.
In this study, we highlight the potential importance of another level of analysis-that of occupational group affiliation-to both promotion decisions made by the organization and individual quit decisions. Various studies have looked at single occupations such as clerks (Petersen et al., 1989) , accountants (Wallace, 1995) , lawyers (Cohen, 1999) , or clergy (McDuff & Mueller, 2000) . Other studies focused on differences in mobility across occupations (Maume, 1999; Wilson, Sakura-Lemessy, & West, 1999) . However, occupational membership has not been studied as a contingent variable for the actual promotion-turnover relationship. There are theoretical grounds for the belief that promotions will not have the same effect on all employee groups, professionals in particular. As a consequence, the occupational group may constitute an important reference point for individuals when they evaluate their promotion chances and an important policy variable for the organization for the design of reward systems and for rewarding and retaining individuals. We therefore ask whether in different occupational groups, the effect of promotion on turnover varies and whether within the same occupational group, better promoted individuals tend to quit less. We also examine how different occupational groups of employees are treated in terms of their promotion opportunities and the indirect effect this has on the probability of their leaving the organization. Third, we model the specific effects of different types of promotion on quit behavior. Two types of promotion are modeled: namely, grade and status promotion. Although grade promotion involves movement along the job ladder without changes in responsibility, status promotion involves changes in responsibilities and might require the existence of a vacancy. This distinction, which is rarely used in empirical research (see Robson, Wholey, & Barefield, 1996 for an exception), may have implications for the design of human resource policies and the concern for the individual's well-being.
We examine how these refinements affect promotion-turnover patterns over time by using a unique data set and a longitudinal design. We use longitudinal data (see also Dickter, Roznowski, & Harrison, 1996) on actual careers in a large bureaucracy during 9 years of employment. We also use comprehensive data (i.e., a sample consisting of all employees) and study the complex processes simultaneously, which allows us to study particular temporal effects in more detail. We assume that employees react to organizational rewards and that one of the more easily observed behaviors is the employee's willingness to stay with the organization. In addition, as the current data set does not have performance evaluation data, we assume that the organization gives rewards based on performance.
We next present the theoretical arguments and hypotheses that link actual promotion to voluntary turnover in general. Subsequently we delineate the arguments for the moderating role of occupation group, particularly professional affiliation, in the promotion-turnover relationship, and for the effects of grade and status promotion on turnover. We then present the method, analyses, and findings and conclude with a discussion.
THEORETICAL DISCUSSION ACTUAL PROMOTION AND TURNOVER
Our basic argument is that, on the whole, employees with a record of past promotions are less likely to quit the organization. This argument emphasizes the importance of rewards, particularly promotion, in creating an employment environment that induces workers to remain employed in the organization.
1
Most theoretical arguments for a relationship between promotion and voluntary turnover rely on March and Simon's (1958) influential formulation on causes of turnover (Griffeth & Hom, 1995; Trevor, 2001) . In this formulation, the employee's decision to quit is jointly dependent on the perceived ease of movement and the perceived desirability of that movement. Although other formulations that do not necessarily assume rational behavior exist in the literature (Lee & Mitchell, 1994) , most treatments portray a relatively rational individual weighing the costs and benefits of quitting, particularly in terms of his or her capacity and motivation to move (e.g., Bridges & Villemez, 1991) .
Unlike perceived potential for promotions, which indicates cognition, actual promotions constitute behaviors. As such, they represent actual rewards and resource commitments conferred on the individual by the organization, not just promises that may go unrealized. Like other behaviors, actual promotion also constitutes an event that produces both tangible outcomes and information that can be experienced or observed by a variety of internal and external actors. These may include the individual, other individuals within the organization or in the individual's reference group, the organization itself, and external actors such as past or future employees, potential employers, and the like. Operating through the reaction of these various actors, actual promotions affect the ease with which individuals can quit and the desirability of their doing so.
There are three main related mechanisms through which the actual promotion of individuals may influence the likelihood of their staying or quitting. First, promotions confer benefits such as status, skill development, and job satisfaction, which may be contingent on the individual's staying in the same organization. Therefore, other things being equal, such as education and position in the hierarchy, the more the individuals perceive opportunities for further promotions in the current organization, the less desirable and likely their voluntary quitting becomes. Individuals who have already been promoted may be particularly more likely to be promoted again in the future. Past promotions can reinforce the expectation of the individual that the firm will repeat its behavior in the future. Assuming that a promotion ceiling has not been reached and that their qualifications and performance are satisfactory, employees may expect the firm to provide them with future promotions. This is particularly true when employees believe that their future promotions are also of value to the firm.
Second, actual promotion may also affect ease of movement. Even when promotion opportunities are scarce or unknown, in which case it may be less desirable to stay, the individual may find it difficult to quit (Doeringer & Piore, 1971) . This is so because over time and with ever more promotions, the individual becomes "entrapped" by developing firm-specific skills, loyalty, and commitment (Carson et al. 1994) . The more employees are promoted, the less employable they may be to other organizations and, to the extent that they are satisfied with and attached to their employment situation, the harder it may become for them to leave.
Third, a record of actual promotions may signal the employee's qualities to potential employers (Bernhardt & Scoones, 1993; Trevor, 2001; Trevor et al., 1997; Waldman, 1990) . Because these employers may not always be able to observe the employee in action, they may need to use his or her resume as a proxy. Therefore, in the particular circumstances in which employees' abilities are less observable and less firm specific, actual promotion may in fact lead to more hiring away of employees and increase the quit rate through its effect on the ease of movement.
The above arguments highlight the mediating role of expectations for future promotion but also suggest a direct link between actual promotions and quit behavior based on restricted mobility due to past promotions. The three mechanisms portray actual promotion as having a self-reinforcing quality to it, simultaneously increasing the benefits of staying and the impediments and risks of quitting, yet they also suggest a countervailing force-that of external offers.
Notwithstanding the potential effect of promotions in inducing turnover through external offers, we see several reasons why the effects of this mechanism will not be so pronounced. First, the requirement that employee skills will be less observable to potential employers may also make it difficult for them to evaluate the extent to which these skills are firm specific or transferable. Second, there are offsetting forces to employees' interorganizational mobility such as the cost of engaging in a job search or a preference to avoid the potential uncertainty involved in taking a new job with a different employer. Finally, there are some circumstances in which this mechanism may be less applicable such as when the market is not competitive or when quitting employees prefer to be unemployed rather than work for other firms. 2 We therefore suggest that when other factors such as education and position in the organization are held constant, the expectations for future promotions and the self-reinforcing quality of prior promotions will outweigh the potential effect of external visibility. This discussion can be summarized in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Given the employee's education and position in the organization hierarchy, an increase in the number of promotions will reduce the probability of a voluntary quit.
The above discussion also established several contingencies that may moderate the relationship, primarily the degree to which employees' skills are firm specific, the degree to which the employee develops loyalty toward the organization, and the degree to which his or her abilities can be observed by external observers. These contingencies will play a part in our subsequent discussion of professions and occupations as contingencies.
OCCUPATIONS AS A MODERATOR: PROFESSIONAL AND MANAGER-ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYEES
Overlaying on the arguments for a general relationship between actual promotion and quit behavior is the rationale for the role of occupational group affiliation as moderating the promotion-turnover relationship. It rests on differences across occupations in the nature of work and training, what employees value and believe in, and the characteristics of their skills, such as transparency and specificity (Robson et al., 1996) . It also rests on the capacity of occupational groups to serve as reference groups for comparing jobrelated facets (e.g., Kulik & Ambrose, 1992; Shah, 1998) . Different occupations may also have different career ladders and labor-market conditions and therefore present different mobility opportunities across and within organizations (Bridges & Villemez, 1991) . The setting under investigation would seem to call for a two-subgroup division of the manager-administrator and professional (MAP) definition into those who are professionals (engineers, accountants, lawyers, and computer specialists) and those who are managers and administrators.
3 Thus, in developing our arguments for occupations as moderating the promotion-turnover relationship, we particularly focus on the differences between MAP employees. The basic difference between these groups is that professionals view their careers within the context of their occupation and not their organizational affiliation, as do managers and administrators do (Blau & Scott, 1962; Bridges & Villemez, 1991; Kalleberg & Berg, 1987; Kornhouser, 1966; Wallace, 1995) .
Professions can be defined in terms that involve the existence of institutions like associations, publications, and licensing (e.g., Robson et al. 1996) or defined more loosely in terms of the type of work and training required to perform the work. Exempt as they are from the hours and wages regulations, professionals are those whose work requires advanced knowledge in a field of inquiry-knowledge based on lengthy, specialized intellectual instruction and study (Roomkin, 1989) . Abbott (1988) used a less comprehensive definition: "Professions are exclusive occupational groups applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases" (p. 131). One could arguably include administrators and managers in this category, but Abbott claims that management, as a general term, cannot be identified as a profession, one of the reasons being the large number of individuals in management who are lawyers, accountants, and engineers by training.
A main difference in the work of managers and professionals is in the supervision of people and the application of specialized knowledge. Furthermore, the interests of the people in the two subgroups appear to be different when it comes to serving in nonprofessional organizations. Professionals, especially those serving in nonprofessional organizations, are seen as more committed to their occupation than to their organization (Blau & Scott, 1962; Kalleberg & Berg, 1987) . The main argument is that professionals are more interested in the development of (generalized) skills and status within the profession, whereas managerial and administrative employees are embedded in the culture of organizational hierarchy and status and, to some degree, develop more firm-specific skills. In other words, professionals, who may be a minority of employees in bureaucratic organizations, are assumed to use their professional standards as a frame of reference.
A tension between the professional standard of employment and the nature of bureaucratic nonprofessional organizations may arise if one assumes a zero-sum game between organizational and professional commitment (Wilensky, 1964) . However, other factors based on adaptation may mitigate the tension: Professionals may have adapted their working situation in nonprofessional organizations so that it is similar to the custom in professional organizations, such as accounting firms (Wallace, 1995) . Alternatively, professionals may self-select themselves into organizations that at the outset expect them to have higher organizational, as opposed to occupational, commitment.
Aside from the differences in employee commitment and skill specificity, which may increase the likelihood of professionals quitting, other factors can make them more mobile. Professionals by their nature are more easily transferred across organizational boundaries. They share problem-solving routines and skills, norms of conduct, and network ties (developed in professional schools and later on the job through ongoing relationships with professional peers). These features of professional life first facilitate the search process via better information channels. Subsequently, they ease the entry to a new job in a different organization. As noted by Mintzberg (1998, p. 143) , the profession itself, not the manager, supplies the structure and coordination required for performing.
Generally, when the organization wants to retain professionals, it may need to offer them future employment in the organization as a consequence of their greater mobility. In the framework of the present research, this can be done through the rewards the organization distributes, especially promotion.
The organization that is the subject of this study has, so we learned, only one job ladder that encompasses all MAP employees, which may indicate that it is interested in attracting and retaining professional as well as other managerial employees. However, in the absence of specific mechanisms adapted to professionals, this symbolic gesture might not be enough to make the behavior of the professional employees comparable to that of the managerial employees. Therefore, some compensation in the form of higher rates of promotion for professional employees is to be expected. In addition, to the extent that professionals are more mobile across organizations, their promotion may induce external offers, which further requires an adaptive response by the organization. 4 In sum, there are arguments to suggest that professionals may have more opportunities to leave because of their general skills, lower organizational attachment, or ease of search and transfer. On the other hand, knowing this, the employer has reason to provide them with more inducements such as promotions. Therefore, we offer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Given the same individual characteristics and the same level in the organizational hierarchy, a. the likelihood of professionals quitting will be inversely related to the number of their promotions (within-group prediction); b. the likelihood of managers quitting will be inversely related to the number of their promotions (within-group prediction); c. the decline in quit rate due to number of promotions will be less pronounced for professionals than for managers and administrators (between-group prediction).
GRADE AND STATUS PROMOTIONS
In addition to the prediction of a general relationship between actual promotion and quit behavior, we also distinguish between grade and status promotions, the two main types of promotions that MAP employees enjoy. Status promotion is an upward move that includes change in job classification as well as in job level. By contrast, grade promotion is an upward move that includes only change in job level or job grade. Status promotion that includes change in job classification (or occupation) also includes changes in responsibilities. For instance, moving from a job classification of senior engineer to supervisor engineer is considered here to be a status promotion. However, staying under the classification of senior engineer and being promoted to a higher job level is considered here as a grade promotion. Historically, the status promotion system has been popular in large organizations, although in recent decades a grade-level structure has been introduced (see Petersen et al., 1989) .
These two types of promotions may have different meaning for employers and employees. Employers, who distribute the rewards, might prefer grade promotion because it does not entail changes in the visible hierarchy of the employees. Status promotion needs the creation of a vacancy in some cases, and this means that promotions are limited by the existence of such a vacancy. By contrast, grade promotions are less limited and can be distributed more freely by the employer. If employees are largely indifferent to the different types of promotion, the employer can design a system that includes relatively more grade promotion. Status promotion would appear to convey more than change in monetary rewards and, as such, might have a greater influence than grade promotion on the probability of leaving the organization. Furthermore, status promotions tend to be more visible.
In the case of professionals, there are two factors that may produce different effects for grade and status promotions on turnover. First, with professional employees, upward mobility may signal professional immobility (Wallace, 1995) . It may suggest that they have reached a ceiling in grade promotions and therefore need to move to an administrative position if they are to rise further. Consequently, unlike the case of employees in general, status promotion may in fact lead professionals to quit less because it reduces the likelihood that they will be hired away. In addition, to the extent that status promotion also includes a change in job content and renewal of skills, professionals may value status promotion in a different way than grade promotion because they are interested in enhancing their skills. Therefore, status promotions for professionals may decrease their quit behavior through decreasing their opportunity set and through enhancing the desirability of staying. To summarize:
Hypothesis 3a: The decrease in likelihood of quitting due to status promotion will be stronger than for grade promotion, given the same individual and organizational characteristics.
Hypothesis 3b: Given the same number of promotions, the stronger decrease in likelihood of quitting due to status promotion will be more pronounced among professional employees than among managers and administrators.
LIKELIHOOD OF PROMOTION
Generally embedded in March and Simon's (1958) framework, our predictions so far have linked individuals' quit rate to individual variables, such as promotion history and type of promotion and to structural variables such as professional affiliation. Our theoretical arguments have highlighted the role of weighing promotion opportunities and the likelihood of being promoted as key considerations in making quit decisions. Therefore, it seems worthwhile to examine the effects of these variables on promotion likelihood as well (e.g., Petersen et al., 1989; Rosenbaum, 1984) . The idea is that in making quit decisions, the employees assess their promotion opportunities based on their own promotion experience and the opportunity and reference base set by other structural factors. Particularly, individuals are likely to assess whether their rate of promotion is in line with that of coworkers at the same occupational level (e.g., Adams, 1965; Festinger, 1954) . As we have already suggested, individuals more regularly promoted in the past, particularly professionals, have a higher likelihood of being promoted in the future. Second, over time the firm observes the quit behavior of individuals and groups and can adjust its promotion policies to ensure that valuable employees who appear likely to quit will reassess their intentions. Therefore, examining the predictors of likelihood of promotion may generate additional insights into the dynamics of the promotion-turnover relationship.
DATA AND METHOD

DATA AND MEASURES
In this research, we used data sets provided to us by a regulated firm located in the United States with between 26,000 and 31,000 employees in each year of the period 1978 to 1986. 5 The structure and employment system of this firm is similar to those found in other large U.S. organizations. We had full access to the data sets and extracted and organized the data needed for this study. The firm employs manpower with diverse skills to produce and deliver the services it provides. Employees fall into four occupational groups: bluecollar workers, clerical workers, technical workers, and MAP. Among the professionals are lawyers, accountants, and engineers (e.g., civil and mechanical engineers). Managers include supervisors, plant managers, division managers, and so forth.
The data analysis conducted in this article relates only to the 4,500 MAP employees that the firm hired from 1978 to 1986. It should be noted, however, that the sample constituted the firm's entire population of MAP employees hired in this period. These employees were employed, in the period under study, at job levels in the range of 3 to 18. The definition of the variables used and their means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1 . Some of the variables change over time, and some do not.
INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The variable number of promotions measures the number of past promotions, and it is updated every time promotion occurs. Because we used only records of employees for whom we had a full career history, each employee starts with 0 promotions. The mean number of promotions is 1.13 for managerial-administrative employees and 1.15 for professional employees.
The variables mean percentage of employees promoted each year and mean percentage employees quitting each year were constructed by dividing the number of promotions and quits for each year by the number of managerialadministrative and professional employees present in the organization in that year. We find that about 26% of managerial-administrative employees and about 28% of professional employees are promoted each year. The yearly rate of voluntary turnover for managers-administrators and for professionals is 8.7% and 6.7%, respectively. 6 The quit rates are comparable to those in studies of quit rates in large organizations in the United States. From the descriptive statistics it appears that professionals are promoted more than managerial-administrative employees, and at the same time quit less.
CONTROL VARIABLES
In research that deals with quit behavior and promotions, an important control variable is the measure of pay. Reflecting the idea that employees are interested in the relative status of the rewards they obtain (Adams, 1965; Festinger, 1954) , the measure we use is not the salary per se but the proportion by which an employee's salary is above or below the mean for that year (McDuff & Mueller, 2000; Trevor, 2001) . The mean of the annual salary is calculated for each group of employees for each year and then the actual wage of an individual is divided by this mean. Subtracting 1 from the result shows whether an individual has more or less than the mean for all employees in his or her group. From this continuous variable, two separate variables were constructed: positive and negative. All of the employees who had an annual salary above the mean were assigned the proportion above the mean for the variable positive and 0 for the variable negative. The same calculation was done for the employees who were below the mean.
We used this procedure for two reasons. First, it allows us to examine how deviating from the mean annual salary affects the employee's propensity to quit. Second, because pay is measured in a 9-year interval it needs adjustment of one kind or another (e.g., using the consumer price index). A relative measure provides such adjustment. The mean of the variable positive for MAP employees is .08 for managers-administrators and .09 for professionals. Regarding the negative variable, the highest differences are among the managers-administrators compared to the professionals: -.14, versus -.08. This may mean that among managers-administrators, there are more differences regarding pay compared to the professional group.
In a field study that deals with a somewhat diverse population, we need to take into consideration other factors that are expected to influence turnover (Griffeth et al., 2000) . Two groups of variables are controlled for: demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, and ethnicity) (e.g., Trevor, 2001 ) and measures that serve as proxies of productivity-seniority and education (highest degree received) in the human capital literature (McDuff & Mueller, 2000) . These control variables are considered standard in related research, and including them in the analyses reduces the risk of underspecification of models (e.g., Griffeth et al., 2000; Kalleberg & Mastekaasa, 2001; Petersen et al., 1989) .
METHODS
The preferred approach in modeling promotion and quit rates is event history analysis (Dickter, Roznowski, & Harrison, 1996) . This method accounts for the time elapsed between changes (promotion, departure) and the value of the destination state once change occurs. It also easily incorporates timevarying covariates. One of the central concepts in event history analysis is the hazard rate, which is a conditional density function: the density that a state is left at duration t, given that it was not left before duration t. The hazard rate is formally defined as follows:
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The specification in equation 2 was used to estimate the departure models (quits) in Table 2 the specification in formula 2 was used.
The Weibull distribution is one of a family of distributions used in event history analysis. It is fairly flexible because it can model monotonically falling or monotonically increasing risk. Because the Weibull distribution is used to model quit behavior, the expectation is that the risk of leaving the organization will be monotonically decreasing. The duration that is used with this specification is seniority in the organization. For the promotion specification, we used the time spent at a grade as the dependent duration variable, modeling "interarrival" times between promotions.
For estimating promotion likelihood (see Table 3 ) we used the proportional hazards log-logistic distribution specified as follows:
The proportional hazard log-logistic distribution is one of the most flexible distributions in the family of distributions commonly used in research dealing with event history models. Its flexibility stems from the possibility of estimating decreasing as well as increasing risk in the same estimated model. Table 2 shows the pattern of turnover among MAP employees and the importance of the type of promotion (grade vs. status) among managersadministrators and professional employees. The table includes six models. The first model tests the general relationship between actual promotions and turnover (H1), the second model takes into account professional affiliation (particularly, engineers, lawyers, accountants, and computer specialists) and will be used later in the discussion on promotion likelihood. The next two models test H2. Models 3 and 4 take into account the possibility that the effect of promotion and turnover is related directly to professional affiliation, the same models being used separately for managers-administrators (Model 4) and professionals (Model 3). Models 5 and 6 look at the relative importance of status and grade promotions in the two occupational groups (H3).
RESULTS
THE GENERAL ACTUAL PROMOTION-TURNOVER RELATIONSHIP
The first model shows clearly that being promoted is negatively related to the probability of quitting the job. The coefficient -.35 of the variable number of promotions represents a reduction in the probability of quitting by -29.5%. If we take as our baseline the mean number of promotions, which is between 1.1 and 1.2, the result means that past promotions reduce the probability of quitting by about a third, regardless of seniority. In addition, as shown by the pay variables, being paid below the mean is negatively significant (-2.3 [.26 ]), which means that employees whose pay approaches the mean are less likely to quit. By contrast, being paid above the mean (-.38 [.42 ]) has no effect on the probability of leaving the organization. These results confirm the general hypothesis (H1) that argues for the importance of promotion for MAP employees.
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATION
Models 3 and 4 take into account the possible importance of occupational affiliation in mitigating or enhancing the effect of promotions found in the sample population as a whole. In testing Hypothesis 2, we use Model 3, which can also be regarded as a full interaction model in which we do not assume the same influence of the control variables on quit behavior. In Model 3, we find that the number of promotions indeed influences the probability of quits among the professional employees. The coefficient of -.44 (.06) (p < .01) suggests a strong influence of this variable, representing a reduction of the probability of quitting by 36%: Employees with the same characteristics (represented by the control variables) who are promoted three times will be 100% less likely to quit.
8 Consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 1, the results for Hypothesis 2a found that the likelihood of professionals quitting is also negatively influenced by the number of promotions.
Model 4 includes the same variables as Model 3, but it is used to predict the likelihood of quits among managerial-administrative employees only (H2b). Here again, we find that promotions ought to be considered when dealing with quits. In this model, the coefficient of the variable number of promotions (-.33 [.05 ]) is significant (p < .01), suggesting that one promotion reduces the probability of quitting by 28%. To test Hypothesis 2c, we need to compare the coefficients and probabilities of Models 3 and 4. Examining the probabilities, we see that promotions among professionals are more important in predicting turnover and each promotion reduces the probability of quitting by 36%, compared to 28% for managerial-administrative employees. However, to confirm Hypothesis 2c statistically, we have to show that the difference in the effect of the two groups is significant. Comparing the coefficients in Models 3 and 4, the variable representing promotion fails to show a significant (less than 5%) difference. A t test on the difference showed a significance level of 14%. Although the differences between the two groups are visible and pronounced, the lack of an accepted significance level does not allow us to consider the hypothesis as confirmed.
TYPE OF PROMOTIONS
Models 5 and 6 look at possible differences between the two types of promotions and the reaction to them by the two employee groups (managers/ administrators and professionals). The models include both types of promotions, status and grade, in an additive mode and allow us to test Hypothesis 3. The findings for the two groups of employees are straightforward: the effect of both types of promotions is negative and significant for the two groups. In Model 5, which looks only at professional employees, we find that both types of promotion are influential in reducing turnover: coefficients -.50 (.15) for grade promotion and -.43 (.06) for status promotion. The same is found in Model 6 for managerial-administrative employees, although the coefficients are somewhat lower, -.38 (.10) for grade promotion and -.32 (.05) for status promotions. Compared to the same coefficients for professional employees, the coefficients are still sizable and significant.
Hypothesis 3a suggested that the relationship between status and grade promotion would be in favor of status promotion. However, the results show that among the two occupational groups, grade promotions are more influential than status promotion in affecting quits. Thus Hypothesis 3a was not confirmed. To test Hypothesis 3b, we compare the coefficients of Models 5 and 6. Although the differences in the effects of status and grade promotions for the two occupational groups are sizable (-.50 vs. -.38 for grade promotion and -.43 vs. -.32 for status promotion), a conservative t test does not show any significant differences. Thus, Hypothesis 3b was not confirmed.
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES: LIKELIHOOD OF PROMOTION
To shed additional light on the findings and to build on our theoretical discussion, we also modeled the likelihood of promotion in the organization. This is done to observe how the different groups of employees are treated in terms of their promotion opportunities and the indirect effect of this on the probability of their leaving the organization. A set of three models is presented in Table 3 . The first model is used as a baseline of promotion likelihood, the second includes a control for professional affiliation, and the third an additional variable that represents previous number of promotions. The variables of interest are those that control for professional affiliation and those that relate to the effect of past promotions on future promotions. Model 2 elicits a coefficient for the variable professional of .10 (.03), which is significant (p < .01), meaning that being a professional in this organization entails a higher probability of promotion. An additional individual level variable-namely, the number of past promotions-which was also added to the analysis (Model 3), shows a positive effect. The coefficient of .60 (.01) means that people who were promoted in the past are more likely to be promoted in the future.
In the previous section, in which we modeled the quit behavior of employees, we did not find any significant differences between managers-administrators and professionals regarding the probability of quitting. Here, we find that being professional entails a higher rate of promotion, which can in turn explain the lack of a difference in the quit behavior models. In Table 2 , we find that although promotions are important in reducing quits, professionals are not less likely to quit. On the other hand, Table 3 suggests that professionals are more likely to be promoted. More specifically, the coefficient of the variable professionals is .02 (.07) (see Table 2 , Model 2), which suggests indeed that a professional does not quit more than a managerial-administrative employee. The significant and positive coefficient of the same variable in Table 3 , Model 2 (.10 [.03]) indicates that those employees who are professionals are more likely to be promoted.
DISCUSSION
Our study aimed to reexamine the general relationship between promotion and turnover, focusing on actual promotion, as opposed to attitudes to or perceptions of promotion, and to look at the potential effects of occupational affiliation and type of promotion.
A key finding of this study is that individuals who were more often promoted in the past are less likely to voluntarily leave the organization. This finding is particularly strong when other factors that can affect quit behavior are controlled for. First, the effect of seniority, which is usually found in turnover models, works to a large extent through promotion and salaries: Once these factors are taken into account, the effect of seniority decreases strongly. In addition, being relatively overpaid does not affect turnover and being relatively underpaid increases it. But when taking into account position in the wage hierarchy, promotion experience matters for turnover. Thus, being promoted appears to be a reward valued by employees over and above the salary they draw.
This finding is important, given the scarcity of research linking actual promotion and turnover (Carson et al., 1994) . It is also consistent with previous findings of negative effects of actual promotion on turnover (Dreher, 1982; Peterson et al., 1989; Stumpf & Dawley, 1981) . Even though actual promotions may affect the opportunity set as perceived by the employee by indirectly signaling his worth to potential employers (e.g., Trevor et al., 1997) , this countervailing mechanism seems to be overshadowed by other influences and generally less pronounced from reasons specified earlier in our theoretical discussion. Particularly, the study provides support for two of the theoretical mechanisms described before: Actual promotions indicate the potential for future promotions and benefits, and they cement the investments of the employee and the organization. The finding, reported in Table 3 , that employees who were promoted in the past are more likely to be promoted in the future provides additional support for the role of actual promotions. It gives particular support to the argument that past promotions tend to increase employees'expectations of a mutually rewarding future relationship with the organization (e.g., Tsui, Pearce, Porter, & Tripoli, 1997) . Therefore, individuals' past promotions reduce their incentive to quit through influencing the opportunity set they see.
A second key finding of the study concerns the role of professional affiliation. Contrary to our expectations, professionals had similar quit rates to those of managers and administrators and the reduction in quit rate was not affected differently by the number of past promotions. Yet, when we consider promotion likelihood, we find that professionals were promoted at higher rates than managers and administrators. Even though our hypotheses concerning the role of occupation affiliation as a moderator were only partially confirmed (H2a, H2b), the findings as a whole do imply some role for occupational affiliation (Model 2 in Tables 2 and 3 ). Professional affiliation serves as a reference by changing the opportunity set seen by the individual and thus indirectly his or her tendency to quit. This effect supports the suggested mechanisms of skill generality, professional commitment and relationships, and the nature of the professional work.
What can explain the fact that professionals quit at the same rate as their managerial and administrative peers even though they are promoted more? The most plausible explanation is that the organization adapted its promotion policies. These findings suggest that even though the organization uses a single promotional ladder for managers-administrators and for professionals, it tended to use promotions as a lever to respond to observed differences in quit behavior across groups. By granting better promotion opportunities to the group of professionals, the organization might have acted to counter their presumed higher probability of quitting and made it comparable to the managerial-administrative group. These combined findings do not lend direct support for a moderating role of occupational group affiliation.
However, they suggest that by differentially affecting promotion opportunities, primarily by serving as a reference for the individual and as a potential policy variable for the organization, occupational group affiliation does affect the promotion-quit relationship.
A third finding of the study is that both grade and status promotions reduce the probability of quitting for both professionals and managers-administrators, with no material differences across types of promotions or employee groups. Although this finding is not in line with our expectations, it can be explained in the following way. It is possible that although promotions tend to decrease quits, the employees either do not differentiate between different types of promotions in a meaningful way or their preferences for each type are distributed evenly.
Taken as a whole, the findings of this research support the arguments that rewards and institutions affect the way employees behave. Employees who receive more promotions are less likely to leave the organization. The previously discussed inability of employees as individuals to influence the way the employment system operates in the short run is valid at the individual level, but it might not be valid at the group level. Assuming some level of ability to change and some level of intention to take into account employees' behavior, the organization can adjust the employment system to the employees' preferences. The question of the origin of the initial push to introduce a variety of employment systems to the different groups of employees remains open.
Although we began by emphasizing how the individual and the organizational level intersect in promotion and turnover processes, the study raises the possibility that an intermediate level of analysis-that of the occupational group-needs to be examined. Particularly, although individual quit behavior in one organization is not cumulative, it is possible for organizations to use aggregate group quit behavior, along with other performance measures, as feedback to evaluate and revise promotion policies. In this way, the commonly conceived one-way relationship between promotion and turnover can become a two-way street. Thus, quit behavior considered a terminal state in the employee's mobility within an organization can be an input to subsequent organizational decisions including hiring, promotions, and development. Second, occupational group affiliation serves as a reference for the individual in delineating his opportunities to be promoted (which in turn affects withdrawal decisions). This highlights the role of social context in influencing comparisons and individual career decisions.
The study's findings also have practical implications for organizations, employees in general, and professionals in particular. The findings reestablish the importance of actual promotions as a mechanism for the organization to allocate rewards to retain its employees and one that is valued by the employees themselves. Particularly, promotions seem to signal a potential for future promotions in the organization and to be effective in reducing any incentive the individual might have to seek a transfer to another employer and the mobility to do so. Employees seem to rely on their own past promotions and the promotion likelihood of their group to project future prospects and to make moves. In making mobility decisions, professionals consider their particular occupational circumstances but also react to inducements allotted by the organization in the form of better promotion opportunities. In addition, organizational responsiveness to differences in the occupational group's likelihood to quit may affect the employees' actual propensity to quit. The findings also suggest that organizations can use both grade and status promotions to affect quit behavior. Therefore, organizations have more flexibility in motivating and retaining employees. There is no need for a vacancy to give someone a promotion.
These findings support a rather rational view of individual and organizational decision making. Individuals consider their own promotion experience in weighing promotion opportunities and eventually deciding whether to stay or quit. Organizations may tend to promote more those valuable individuals who are more likely to quit. However, in showing the temporal consistency of promotions, the findings can also support a less rational view of social behavior: Individuals may use past events to project similar events in the future, and organizations may follow precedents and routines rather than constantly weigh costs and benefits of particular policies. Therefore, a complementary explanation to the rational and calculated one rests on how history and appropriateness place constraints on current choices (March & Olsen, 1989) .
Although the study used a unique temporal and detailed data set, its applicability to other contexts needs to be established in future studies. Better data and measures can make this research more complete. Future research could take these findings as a point of departure to evaluate the same processes in different time frames, types of organizations, industries, and countries. It will be particularly important to look at more refined occupational groups and to compare professional and nonprofessional organizations and voluntary and nonvoluntary turnover (e.g., Shaw et al., 1998) . The advent of the new knowledge workers and with them the blurring of boundaries between professionals and other workers (e.g., Scarbrough, 1999 ) also suggests exciting possibilities for future research. Finally, by dealing with complex organizational processes, the study can also be connected to wider concerns of organizational research such as the causes and consequences of inertia, diversity, institutional memory, and competitive advantage.
CONCLUSION
This study illustrates that promotion and turnover are complex, multilevel, and dynamic processes that operate through both direct experiences and interpretation. The future study of these processes faces the simultaneous needs of refining the general relationship and seeing them in the larger context of other individual and organizational decisions and behaviors. A main contribution of our study lies in establishing that employees' occupational affiliation may affect general promotion and turnover processes. Our study particularly establishes that the distribution of actual rewards in organizations over time not only affects individual and group behavior but is potentially affected by them in the aggregate.
NOTES
1. We focus on voluntary rather than involuntary turnover because it is better aligned with our general interest in the ways organizational rewards affect employee discretionary behavior. Voluntary turnover is governed by different dynamics than involuntary turnover and has different implications at both the individual and organizational levels (e.g., Shaw, Delery, Jenkins, & Gupta, 1998) .
2. Of these various mitigating forces, the level of competition may be an important contextual variable specific to our study as the setting involved was regulated in the study's period.
3. We prefer to use the term administrators rather than administrative employees because most employees in this group occupy high-level administrative positions as opposed to lowerlevel clerical ones.
4. Employees' mobility across firms may vary by what Bridges and Villemez (1991) called the market viability of different occupations. For example, the degree to which work is standardized is an important consideration for both employees and employers. It enables them to know what they are getting when they are accepting jobs or hiring, respectively.
5. For reasons of confidentiality, we are able to provide only limited information regarding the firm and its operations.
6. The main data set that we used included two main categories for employees who left the organization. These categories differentiate between those who were discharged from the organization and those who resigned voluntarily. We verified this differentiation with the people who were in charge of collecting the data.
7. Where x(t) represent the covariates (time varying and others), T represents a random variable denoting the amount of time spent in a place before a transition or censoring occurs, and t denotes the duration before transition is made.
8. To calculate the influence of a coefficient in the model, the formula used is: Percent change = exp (β) -1) × 100. In our case, exp (-.44) -1) × 100 = -35.6% (approximately 36%).
9. Note that rather than directly linking likelihood of quitting with likelihood of promotion, we conducted separate analyses for each likelihood variable instead and made inferences by comparison. This simplification is the one used by Petersen et al. (1989) and takes into account the inherent difference between quit and promotion behaviors: Although quit behavior is a onetime event, promotion is a renewable process. Therefore, it makes sense to use number of promotions as a predictor of quit rates, but one cannot use individual quit history to predict promotions
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